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Lessons for Europe from Language Policy in Australia

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1. Introduction

Language learning is credited with a major role in forming the Europe envisaged by European Union policy-makers. The key document, the Maastricht Treaty of 1993, commits the member states to a policy of full respect for the cultural and linguistic diversity of the member states.[i] Increased language teaching is to foster the "European" dimension in education, though what this covers is unclear.[ii] The treaty, like its predecessor the Treaty of Rome of 1958, has the full force of international or supranational law, taking precedence over national law. Such treaties codify the efforts of European Union states to concert their policies in a wide range of fields, now including culture, and to shed part of their sovereignty.

One can question whether the ongoing processes of economic and political integration and homogenisation are compatible with the goal of maintaining linguistic and cultural plurality and diversity. There are varied and conflicting interpretations of all such concepts and their reciprocal compatibility. It is therefore important to explore how explicit "European" language policies are, which interpretations of integration and plurality they support, and whether implementation of declared policy is taking place and likely to succeed.

Granted the current fluid state in Europe of policy-making for dominant "international" languages, official and/or national languages and a mosaic of other languages, indigenous or immigrated, it may be helpful to assess what lessons can be learned from countries that have attempted global language policy formation, where Australia is one of the most eminent examples. Australia is exceptional in that it has in recent decades moved from a harsh policy of assimilation and imposed monolingualism towards one of accepting the linguistic diversity of indigenous and immigrated languages. Whether the Australian policy is being successfully implemented is another matter, but few if any countries in the world have formulated a comprehensive language policy covering all languages internally and those needed for external geopolitical and trading purposes.

Possible lessons for Europe from the language policy experience of Australia will be explored by analysing how linguistic identity shifts as national identities evolve, the main features of Australian language policy, current moves in European language policy at the supra-statal and statal interface, by setting out some evidence for means and goals in multilingual education, and by drawing some provisional conclusions.

Exploring *language policy* issues is demanding because of the sociolinguistic diversity in each context, the intermeshing of language policy with broader social structures and goals, and because of the prevalence of fuzzy concepts and strategies. There is a need for a conceptual framework for comparative language policy analysis which goes beyond consideration of language in a few domains, and that permits valid comparison of fundamentally different sociopolitical units. It seems to us that this is precisely the challenge of language policy as an explicit concern. There is a substantial amount of documentation and description of language policy, and of language dominance, but our impression is that relatively little effort has gone into clarifying how language policy can be approached in a more rigorous, inter-disciplinary way, although there are significant approaches within political science, the sociology of language, applied linguistics, and economics and language.[iii]

There is an unfortunate tendency in political discourse and even some academic discourse to

blur the distinction between *politics* and *policy*. This is a problem that many European languages compound by using the same lexical item (French "politique", Danish/Swedish "politik", Finnish "politiikka") for both.[iv] While we are not in this paper concerned with the politics of language, or political language, we do hope that politicians are interested in language policy, though we sometimes wonder whether this is so. It is our belief that language specialists can and should contribute to language policy in a scientifically informed way.

Language policy is a broad over-arching term for decisions on rights and access to language and on the roles and functions of particular languages and varieties of language in a given polity. Such policies, and the decisions that underpin them, may be more or less overt or covert. Not providing for the implementation of a policy is mere posturing, Khubchandani's term for much language policy in India (private communication). Language policy is concerned with language matters at the collective level, whether statal, supra-statal or sub-statal. Language policy is a super-ordinate category, within which fall operational concerns such as language planning and, as one form of normative regulation, language legislation. Both of these exemplify the more centralistic, government-induced or government-controlled aspects of language policy. Language policies in such domains as business, tourism, the mass media and entertainment (each of which may be statal, supra-statal or sub-statal) are at least partially government-external, and may be overt or, as is more often the case, covert. Language policy is guided by overall policy concerns such as appropriate educational policy or the facilitation of democratic citizenship. Ideally it is guided by a will to respect linguistic diversity and the linguistic human rights of all, at both individual and collective levels. The formulation and implementation of policies which respect linguistic human rights (see the book Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson 1994a) presupposes a recognition of the reality of linguistic hierarchies and the need to mitigate these. Thus addressing the reality of the power relations between users of different languages is a necessary prerequisite for language policy to go beyond posturing.

Language legislation is the regulations at state and sub-state level which guide, specify and implement language policy.[v] The European Union has *supra-statal* rules for the choice and functioning of official languages, for working languages, for language requirements in employment, language use in commercial transactions, products, and the media (Labrie 1993b). In *state* education it is governments that decide on choice of language as medium of instruction, sometimes delegating this to a regional authority.

Language planning conventionally consists of corpus, status and acquisition planning.[vi] Language planning is necessary in a multidialectal and multilingual world, and reflects political and economic choices and the value judgements of the planners. Thus, to take the example of a state that has been more explicit about language policy than others, the French have done *corpus* planning for centuries (via the Académie Française), and have buttressed the *status* of French through promoting its *acquisition* worldwide for a century (via the Alliance Française, the Haut Conseil de la Francophonie ...). The French are currently seeking to curb the invasive thrust of English, nationally and internationally. One of their ploys is a condemnation of the corrupt, bastardized shortcomings of "international" English. Paradoxically this seems to represent the French doing *corpus* planning *for* the guardians of English, which may at the same time be a form of *status* planning *against* the English language.

The conventional categories of language planning tend to overlap each other. In Australia there is an increased acceptance that Australian English exists in its own right, for which there exist appropriate *corpus* instruments (dictionaries, descriptions etc.). This may strengthen the *status* of Australian English (also as a commodity to be sold on the Asian linguistic market) and facilitate Australia's role as an Asian power, with much regional cooperation and many Asian students studying in Australia. In both Australia and Europe there is an intermingling of *status* and *acquisition* planning in the contemporary language policy exercise, and probably a lack of clarity in specifying how various types of language acquisition can lead to desired goals of multilingualism, as our discussion of education below will demonstrate. The EU recommends foreign language learning in member states for the purpose of facilitating the goals of the Maastricht treaty (the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour) while simultaneously serving to create or imagine (in Benedict Anderson's sense, 1983) European identities. The multiple linguistic identities of our children's generation are being forged in EU-

funded programmes such as ERASMUS, LINGUA and SOCRATES, just as they are being informally shaped through the media and youth culture of increasingly mobile and diverse societies.

2. Would the real Europeans and Australians please identify themselves

2.1. Identity as a construction

An individual can have positive regional, national and continental identities, each cohabiting harmoniously, amd with linguistic variation correlating with and constituting each. Education systems reinforce particular identities, and have tended to strengthen the dominant national identity and its standardized language rather than others. One outcome is that most people probably feel more strongly about being French or Danish than about being European. Efforts to promote European integration are implicitly and explicitly attempting to reinforce what is distinctive (familiarity with "other" languages and countries) and what is shared ("the common European heritage"), at the same time as major political, economic and cultural forces are generating new sub-national, national, and supra-national identities. A supra-national European political identity can easily cohabit with a national cultural and political identity (Wæver et al 1993). Such identificatory processes are fluid and need constant negotiation and reinforcement. They will vary across groups (some Europeans are more multilingual than others) and individuals (reflecting different professional, social and experiential variables). Forces of mobility, technology and unification are compelling much larger sections of the population to clarify their supra-national identity as well as to renegotiate their traditional identities. "European" identity will take many forms for many years to come, just as "national" identity in Europe is diverse.

Approaching policy concerns in both Europe and Australia requires not merely concept clarification, and identifying who qualifies as a "real" Australian or European. We also have to ask what the role of language is in the unequal allocation of societal power and its legitimation, and to explore the capacity of dominant groups to set a hegemonic agenda. This is where an approach that sees many of the relevant concepts (European, Australian, integration, minority, ethnicity, etc) as *relations* rather than or in addition to *characteristics* may prove more powerful analytically. The hegemonic view is that "being ethnic", "being a minority", "not being integrated" and "not being European" are characteristic which "justify" the fact that individuals/groups which are "different" (i.e. "deficient") not only do have but *should* have less power and (material) resources than "non-ethnic, integrated, majority-group Europeans or Australians", until they have stopped "being different", i.e. lost their ethnic traits, become integrated into the "mainstream" and worthy of admission to the European Club or acceptance as "real Australians".

Comparison brings out difference. If some people are treated as "different", they have to be different *from* something which is implicitly or explicitly posited as a (desirable) norm. Our position is that differences of this kind can be more profitably understood if they are conceptually treated as socially constructed mutual *relations* between the definer and the defined, rather than as characteristics of the defined. This approach makes it not only possible but necessary to ask questions about the validity of particular definitions of concepts like European or Australian, ethnically/linguistically non-European or non-Australian, European/Australian culture or integration, and the language policy of Europe and Australia. In essence it is a question of who has the power to define and who is being defined.[vii]

2.2. Identities, Europe and European

What then are the European identities or dimensions that the EU wishes to promote through many of its activities, among them its language policy? It is important to clarify who and what is referred to by "Europe" and "Europeans" (or by "Australians").[viii] These designations of

groups of people or places can be *toponyms*, referring to geographical places, *politonyms*, referring to political entities, *ethnonyms* referring to the ethnicities and cultures of the people concerned, or *linguonyms* where the reference is to people speaking specified languages.[ix]

The *toponym* Europe can be prefaced by a geographical modifier, for instance northern or western, but sometimes "western" Europe refers to both north and west, and may include the south. Does eastern or central Europe stretch to the Ural mountains or not, including which former Soviet republics?[x] In popular speech, people from the topographical fringes of Europe such as the British, Danes and Finns appear to regard their countries as lying outside Europe, but here there may be a blurring between a toponym and a politonym.

There are plenty of examples of suprastatal European *politonyms*. The "European" Union and the "European" Parliament now number 15 member states. Presumably the new members of this club, the Austrians, Finns and Swedes, regarded themselves as European in some sense prior to January 1995, and Norway may or may not still do so. The pliable nature of the politonym can be seen from the fact that the Council of Europe currently (July 1995) has 36 members, including Turkey. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), by contrast, included Canada and the US as founding members in 1975, when 35 states were signatories of the Helsinki accords, whereas in 1995 the OSCE (Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe, formerly the CSCE) consists of 51 states.

What does the *ethnonym* "European" culture refer to? Or the "European" heritage? European Studies? Is the borderline between Europe and the Orient a question of Christianity versus Islam and "alien" faiths, in which case is Turkey really more European than the Maghreb? If what distinguishes Turkey and Russia from the Maghreb is that they are secular, is not Turkey then more European than Ireland or southern Italy? And how could the ungodly Soviet Russia qualify? "Fortress Europe" probably has elements of both ethnonym and politonym, conforming to the classic orientalist mould of Us versus Them, the Others. There are manifestly many unclarities in Europe as an ethnonym, meaning that the concept Europe can lead to a diverse harvest of interpretations, as it did in earlier generations.[xi]

What then of languages, and "European" as a *linguonym*? Are "European languages" those that are "traditionally used within a given territory"[xii], when "tradition" is an unclear concept in a world of change, when the "territory" where "European" languages are spoken does not have firm boundaries or coincide with the toponymic Europe? Are Finnish and Estonian, non-Indo-European languages, more European or less European than Panjabi or Hindi, which are Indo-European languages?[xiii] Are only Indo-European languages or only the toponymically European ones of the Indo-European family real European languages, as is often implicitly claimed? When the architects and drafters of the Maastricht treaty referred to European languages, which languages were they thinking of, only the official EU languages, or all languages spoken natively in Europe? Why are European languages "modern" in education in some countries, "living" in others and "foreign" elsewhere? Why in schools is there the widespread pecking-order of modern/foreign languages, with English with the sharpest beak, French and German slightly less greedy but often going hungry, and most other languages, including immigrant languages, starving because they are not seen as "European"?[xiv]

Does a "European" language have certain characteristics, or is it rather to be found in the eye of the observer? By pointing out the multiple denotative and connotative references of "Europe" and "European", and suggesting that one needs to consider whether a designation is toponymic, politonymic, ethnonymic or linguonymic, we are keen to demonstrate that in this way we may be able to render more public and accountable the covert agendas of "European" integration, and the role of language generally and of specific languages in such policies. Definitions of "Europe" are often ethnicist or linguicist[xv], taking the dominant groups or languages as the norm and ignoring the rights of others. Such practices may be unintentional, which means that this process falls into the pattern of how hegemonic ideologies are reproduced.

Likewise, references in the dominant discourse to "minorities", "ethnic groups" or "minority languages" are often exclusionary: only minorities or certain minority groups or languages are seen as ethnic, while majorities are seen as devoid of ethnicity. "National" languages tend in Europe to refer to the languages of the dominant group, and coincide with official languages,

while the opposite may be true in Africa or India. "All languages of India are national languages. No language is anti-national", according to Pattanayak, former Director of the Central Institute of Indian Languages (1988: 379).

A team of Scandinavian and British peace researchers has identified the following four political forces as being decisive in forming Europe over the previous decade (Wæver et al. 1993: 1):

(1) the political stagnation and economic bankruptcy of the Soviet Union; (2) the revitalisation of Western European integration, initially under the banner of "1992", and latterly, and with much more trouble, under "Maastricht"; (3) the widening acceptance that pluralism and markets were essential ingredients for any successful modern society; and (4) the releasing and/or revival of nationalism and xenophobia.

There may be a contradiction between "the revival of nationalism and racism/xenophobia" and "the acceptance of pluralism", as the reference here is to market forces, rather than linguistic and cultural pluralism. When supporters/representatives of the European Union refer to "European integration" (2 in the list), what is generally intended is integration among the members of the self-selected Western European club, and particularly its élites. These have arrogated to themselves the use of the label "European". Neither eastern and central Europe, nor ordinary people, nor minorities in western Europe are agents in this "European integration" process. Within a very narrow definition of "Europe", the marriage between the plurality of market forces and the integration of European élites may prove very successful. But the integration and multiple identities picture is more complex when one considers the entire population of Europe, east and west, south and north, majorities and minorities, with their rich diversity of languages and cultures.

In contemporary processes of integration and disintegration, globalization and europeanization, regionalisation and self-determination, the sovereignty of individual states is being re-thought. Some states are willing to concede part of their sovereignty, either to supra-statal institutions like the EU (on language policy, see Fishman 1994, Labrie 1993b) or internally to autonomous regional authorities (e.g. Catalonia). New states come into existence (e.g. Slovenia, Czechia). A state may wish to concede part of its sovereignty to supra-statal institutions but fiercely oppose internal regional autonomy (e.g. Turkey). States escaping from one type of supra-statal structure may wish to join another (e.g. the Baltic states). Throughout the cold war and the period of decolonisation there was an uneasy marriage between the principle of the indivisibility of states and the right to self-determination. The relationship is now looser, and the principles should not be irreconcilable, in the view of the Secretary-General of the UN[xvi], but there can be no doubt that language plays a role in processes of statal, sub-statal and supra-statal formation. This is manifest in the complex mosaic of "Europe", where identities are currently being refashioned and old certainties challenged.

2.3. Australian identities

Australian identity too has experienced a major process of cultural and linguistic redefinition in recent decades. The continent of Australia has been inhabited by Aboriginal peoples for 40,000 years, by others for 200. The dominant Anglo-Celt group pursued a policy of eliminating the Aboriginal peoples, and assimilating or ignoring other groups, of whom there have always been many (Clyne 1991). Since 1945 a vigorous immigration policy has led to an extremely heterogeneous population. The attempt to adapt to changed political and economic circumstances and to promote social justice for all groups through a policy of multiculturalism (a term borrowed from Canada) was accompanied by soul-searching about the essence of Australian identity, its distinctiveness (geography, life-style, ethnic mixture, etc) and its relationship to the cultures of origin of immigrants (see contributions to Price 1991). Perceptions of Australian identity have fluctuated substantially, as has the tension between diversity and the commonality of Australian values. One dimension of evolving multiculturalist policies[xvii] is language policy.

Australians of European origin are increasingly coming to terms with their past and the realities of the history of their continent. While European Australians tend to be regarded as having history, generally starting two centuries ago, the Aboriginal peoples have timeless dreaming. What for the one group is seen as "pioneer settlement", was invasion and dispossession for the others. European "progress and civilisation" meant subjugation and genocide for the indigenous population (e.g. Fesl 1993, O'Donohgue 1995).

One of the important concerns of the Australian national languages policy is to address this legacy. However, only a small proportion of the 270 indigenous languages of Australia are in a viable condition, Australian society generally is poorly informed about Aboriginal languages, their uniqueness and fragility, and existing support has yet to lead to any Aboriginal language being taught at upper secondary level, where 31 languages other than English are accredited (Amery & Bourke 1994).

The second is a recognition of the reality of Australia's geopolitical position in Asia, rather than considering Australia as a European outpost, and, because of this, a wish to equip Australians to function in languages other than English, particularly Asian languages.

A third central feature of the languages policy is a shift from monolingual assimilationism to a desire to validate the languages other than English that generations of immigrants have brought to Australia, and build on them (Clyne 1991). Multiculturalist policy has traversed several phases (Jupp 1991): euphoric celebration of cultural maintenance, and equality of opportunity and access (1973-78), a consolidatory period based on multi-party support (1978-83), disillusion and retreat (1983-88) under economic pressures, and ambiguity since then, with a wide variety of critiques that cut across a political left-right spectrum. The official focus (in the National Agenda for a *Multicultural Australia*, 1989) is on three dimensions, social justice, economic efficiency, and cultural identity, which includes "the right of all Australians, within carefully defined limits, to express and share their individual cultural heritage, including their language and religion" (Jupp 1991, 151). Such rights are based on the premise that all Australians "should have an overriding commitment to Australia, to its interests and future", its basic democratic principles, and English as the national language (Jupp 1991, 151).

The official policy of multiculturalism is interpreted in widely different ways (summarized in Gobbo 1995), which exemplify the tension between diversity and commonality and the political processes through which Australian identities are being negotiatied and legitimated.[xviii] Mary Kalantzis (1995) sees such processes as involving a creative dynamic between the local and the global "in which negotiating cultural diversity is now a critical necessity ... access to resources and particicpation is increasingly articulated through the discourse of identity and recognition" in public life, in working life, in private life. Although Australia is not involved in a supranational structure like the EU, it is in a comparable postnationalist phase of changed technologies, media and work processes, and multiple identities. "Notions of nation that construct national homogeneity by suppressing varieties of language and custom are no longer relevant and can only be maintained with repressive laws and unacceptable, anti-democratic levels of enforcement (Kalantzis 1995: 5). In her vision of "civic pluralism", "every citizen will need to become a multilingual and multicultural subject" (1995: 6) and the state will need to evolve new ways of mediating diversity, a path that Australia has already adopted. Factors that contributed to this were a weak sense of traditional nationalism, immigration and the multiculturalist policy, an outward-looking economy, addressing the right of self-determination for Aboriginal peoples, and a commitment to social equity. Other analysts are less optimistic about the strengths of Australian democracy (Pilger 1992). Much of Kalantzis' argument could be transposed to the European context.

3. Australian language policy

In Australia there developed over a period of almost two decades a concerted effort on the part of academics, representatives of minority ethnic communities, bureaucrats and politicians to address issues of linguistic diversity and identity. These efforts led to a considerable succession of reports, and culminated in the National Policy on Languages of 1987 (Lo Bianco 1987). The mechanics and politics of engineering this consensus are dealt with in Ozolins 1993.

In Canada the process of initiating work on a language policy was set in motion by a sense of injustice and crisis (Laporte 1994, 99). In Australia this process was a logical outcome of a rights and equality orientation in the 1970s and later multiculturalism. Lo Bianco, the principal architect of Australia's language policy, stresses the mix of social, political and social psychological elements in a process beginning with a language-related group consciousness, and the demonstrable crystallisation of language problems (1990: 67-73). This involved a complex process of forming alliances across groups and creating shared interests, ultimately generating a new political discourse, a rhetoric of "national interest" and good citizenship which could reassure the established order while articulating a case for change.

Lo Bianco states (1990, 77) that a policy must blend together what is 1) intellectually defensible, 2) realistically feasible, 3) equitable to all groups, and 4) in the national interest in that it meets the linguistic needs and opportunities of the mainstream sections of the society. The social goals of the Australian language policy relate to the four E's: *equality, economics, enrichment and external* (Lo Bianco 1990). *Equality* refers to the correlation between language on the one hand and social and economic equality or lack of it on the other. Language policy must serve to correct any systematic injustice, to manage the linguistic ecology. The *economic* goal has to do with multilingualism as a productive asset. The *enrichment* goal draws on arguments for the cognitive, educational and cultural benefits deriving from multilingualism. The *external* goals bring in the geopolitical situation of the country, development cooperation, the transfer of technology and supporting bi- and multilateral relations with other countries. The relationship of the "national" interest to "international" interests is opaque, which the formulation of goals in vague political terms serves to aggravate.

Implementation of the national languages policy of 1987 has led to a major effort in a number of spheres, particularly ESL, Aboriginal languages, cross-cultural training, adult literacy, testing, second/foreign language learning, and Asian studies. The volume of these activities, and the dynamism they represent, is impressive (see the quarterly *Australian Language Matters*). Many language policy issues have been worked through in the past 20 years, and the current focus is on implementation (Djité 1994). There are major contradictions and challenges (Lo Bianco 1994): does an avowedly multiculturalist policy involve a multilingual education system? How do particular language-in-education policies relate to perceived economic prerogatives? Can the various constituencies and competing ideologies underlying the language policy be reconciled?

It is difficult to assess how successful the activities are in promoting the goals of the policy, and it would not be fair to expect major change within a short span of time. On paper the Australian achievement represents a significant advance for those who value bilingualism not only for minorities but also for the linguistically dominant group. Whether language policy implementation will achieve the vision of a more balanced relationship between English and the many European and Asian languages with a strong presence in Australia, only time can tell. The same uncertainty holds for the future of Aboriginal languages. A provisional balance sheet, on the basis of our fieldwork interviews and the extensive written evidence would stress the following.

1. The *politicians and civil servants* who endorsed the policy have been unpredictable in the follow-up of the policy, and have tended to focus on instrumental and essentially export-oriented foreign language needs (particularly Japanese and Indonesian) as opposed to indigenous bilingualism and its potential.

2. There seems to be a mismatch between the declared policy goal of equipping all Australians to function in two languages and the way language needs are seen in the *business world*, which is sceptical about its employees needing multilingual competence. This is an example of inflated views of the ubiquity and supremacy of English, though Australia in fact currently generates a surplus in its trading in Asia. There is no simple correlation between present and future needs and the foreign language competence created through formal and informal education.

3. There are widely divergent assessments, ranging from enthusiastic optimism to disillusioned scepticism, among *language professionals* on whether Australia is really shifting away from a monolingual assimilationist world view, and on whether appropriate multilingual competencies are in fact being created in the educational system. It is probably also inevitable that there

should be a range of views on whether the funds administered to effect the policy, by the National Languages and Literacy Institute of Australia, are being optimally spent, but an independent review in 1995 of the cost efficiency of the Institute was very favourable.

4. The high number of languages learned out of school, and the relatively high number now taught in schools as part of the official syllabus reflect healthy *diversification* and significant legitimation of minority indigenous and immigrant languages. But whether this represents more than a quantitative increase in foreign/second language learning (for which figures are lamentably low in Australia compared with continental Europe) or a qualitative step towards *bilingual education* is in doubt. There are some early and late partial immersion programmes, where children (mostly English-speakers) learn content through the medium of other languages, mainly German. There are a few private schools where languages other than English (e.g. Greek or Italian) are used as media of instruction for part of the time. But neither Aboriginal nor immigrant minority children have any guaranteed right to use their mother tongues as media of instruction or even to learn them as subjects in state elementary schools. The language learning classroom commonly consists of learners for whom the language is genuinely foreign, learners for whom it is a mother tongue, and several mid-way positions. As will be shown in section 5, there are few models in state education that promote really high levels of multilingualism.

Joshua Fishman was gloomy in his assessment in the late 1980's of how far language policy in Australia would contribute to reversing language shift (RLS) and result in fewer additions to the "graveyard" of Aboriginal and immigrant languages: "Unfortunataely ... good intentions are not enough and the steps taken or about to be taken are either largely unrelated, non-productive or even counter-productive as far as intergenerational RLS-payoff is concerned ... Australian policies and processes constitute a positive but ineffective approach to RLS on behalf of recent immigrant languages and a negative but potentially effective approach to RLS on behalf of Aboriginal languages" (1991: 277). Smolicz (1994) is also sceptical about achievements, but hopes there is a changed awareness of the benefits of multilingualism. Gibbons, White and Gibbons (1994) stress that educational policy-makers are still insensitive to the bilingual needs of children and plead for more informed decision-making.

4. The European language policy scene

The amount and type of foreign language learning in EU countries can be seen as a barometer of ongoing processes of "Europeanisation". Equally important is language policy at the supra-state level, and the significance attached to languages as lingua francas, working languages and official languages both within EU institutions and other international fora, private and public. What can be attempted here is not a comprehensive description of the considerable variety of policies at the state and sub-state levels in each European country, but rather an assessment of overall trends and the evolution of policies and practices at the supra-state level that are likely to impinge on language policy at other levels. Supranational language policy is fuzzy and unclear at some points, crystal clear at others. It is being played out against a backcloth of the language policy structures and ideologies of the member states, few of which accord much credit to any principle of multilingualism. Yet multilingualism, paradoxically, is a corner-stone of supranational policy.

There are parallels between the constitutional structure of Australia, with a central "commonwealth" level but education as the responsibility of the individual states (Victoria, New South Wales, etc), and Europe with an emerging "union" level but education as the preserve of each of the 15 states. There is a constant dialectic between the two levels, with many individuals (politicians, bureaucrats, scholars) functioning at both levels. As Monica Heller points out in a review, forthcoming, of Normand Labrie's book "The linguistic construction of the European community", what he documents is "the logical extension of the ideology of the monolingual nation-state, but an extension to what may perhaps be such an ideology's limit", because traditional notions of language and nationhood act as a constraint on the development of supranational structures and processes. A particular tension is that "while national bureaucracies mainly function as agents of linguistic uniformisation, the Community's

bureaucracy exists to allow its linguistic compromises to function (through translation and interpretation)."

According to the Canadian sociolinguist, Corbeil (1994), there is a straight choice in EU language policy between free market forces and a conscious effort to organize European multilingualism. His study focuses on the onward march of English, but a possibility of German advancing, on inroads on national languages in particular domains, and on the desirability of the conflict between national and international languages leading to grassroots democratic involvement in language policy. He pleads for national and supranational language policy to advance jointly and harmoniously.[xix]

Corbeil's analysis is brief and programmatic, but has the merit of addressing the issue of linguistic dominance and the maintenance of multilingual diversity. His focus is though on the "big" languages, the struggle between "international" languages (essentially English, German and French - some languages are more "European" than others) and dominant state languages (like Dutch and Spanish), while marginalized languages, immigrant and indigenous, are ignored. His study is thus symptomatic of much work on European language policy that exemplifies how structural and ideological forces of dominance rationalize a linguicist hierarchy.

During the French presidency of the EU in the first half of 1995, the French government raised two language policy issues[xx], each of which encountered major resistance from their EU partners, who were doubtless unconvinced by French advocacy of multilingualism when the hidden agenda is probably a strengthening of French and concern about the advance of English.

4.1 Working languages, the real supranational languages

One proposal was a restriction of the number of working languages in EU bodies. "European multilingualism" builds on the principle that the 11 dominant languages of the 15 member states (Danish, Dutch, English, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, Swedish) have equal validity as *official* languages. This is a vital means of ensuring that citizens from and in each member state know and can influence what happens in Brussels and Strasbourg. In theory the languages have the same validity and rights as *working* languages, but in practice this principle is respected only in the European Parliament, in some of its functions, and the production of certain types of written document in the Commission. It is scarcely surprising that France's partners are not willing to support a proposal to restrict the rights of their own languages as working languages. On the other hand there is evidence that parliamentarians appreciate that the logistics of working in so many languages creates real problems, and that EU bureaucrats favour a reduction in their number (Schlossmacher 1994). The complexity of rules governing language use in EU institutions is analysed in Coulmas 1991, several contributions to *Sociolinguistica* 8, 1994, and particularly Labrie 1993b, who describes the origins and genesis of suprastatal regulation of language use. The principle of linguistic equality or parity between all official and working languages coexists with a *de facto* pecking order of languages, particularly in preparatory meetings and documents, with French and English securely at the top. The suggestion has been put, informally, to the EU Commission that English should become the sole lingua franca, but there is major resistance to such a proposal, both on grounds of principle (parity, democratic insight and participation in decision-making), and political and economic clout (for instance Germany's perceived self-interest, Volz 1994). The multilingual principle was confirmed by the European Parliament in May 1995[xxi], but is likely to be raised anew at a summit to prepare a new treaty in 1996.

It is mostly in the European Parliament that language policy issues are discussed. 231 written questions were asked on language policy matters over a 20-year period (Labrie 1993b). Thus it was a European Parliamentary report in 1982 that assessed the question of the expense of the multilingual operation of EU institutions. At the European Commission, the administrative headquarters of the EU in Brussels, the translation service in the early 1990s had a staff of 1700, 1200 of whom were translators, producing nearly one million pages of translation a year. The Parliaments's conclusion was that although there were major costs involved, these

represented only 2% of the budget of the EU, and were therefore a reasonable charge in order to guard the right to use all the nine languages. As Labrie points out (1993: 143), the cost of facilitating the exchange of ideas needs to be held up against the cost of other services which promote the free circulation of goods, such as transport systems and environmental protection (assessing relative costs and benefits is a matter that the field of economics and language is likely to shed light on, Grin 1994).

The expansion of the EU in 1995 to 15 members and the concomitant increase in the number of official languages from 9 to 11 increases pressure to further restrict translation and interpretation between all official languages in EU institutions. There is clearly a need for more analysis of the principle of "ethnolinguistic democracy" (Fishman 1994) and the *de facto* hierarchy of languages in the internal affairs of the EU. The current pecking order is perceived as serving the interests of the British and the French, but not the Germans (Volz 1994) and presumably not other groups. The attitudes of members of the European Parliament from Germany (Schlossmacher 1994) and Denmark (Haberland and Henriksen 1991) towards such issues have been studied, but in general there is a striking absence of empirical data on such topics and of attempts to clarify the principles that should undergird the system and its reform. The perspective of "small" EU languages such as those of Scandinavia has been explored, including the difficulty of their speakers getting a democratic hearing (Haberland 1993, Henriksen 1992).

In general there is an absence of explicit language policy documents at both state and suprastatal levels. There are supranational treaty rights for particular languages[xxii], but everyday functioning is determined by rules of habit and constraints of budget and time. With 9 languages, the number of possible combinations for interpretation is 72, and with each enlargement of the EU the logistic problems expand exponentially.[xxiii] Possible future developments are not being consciously explored, except perhaps in the privacy of national foreign ministries, where the relationship between the national interest and "European" interests is decidedly unclear. Possibly the fact that most governments follow a suprastatal language agenda which is not explicit might explain why French proposals for change were met with such resistance.

Ammon (1994) has attempted to predict possible scenarios, on the basis of the limited research evidence, in an introduction to a volume addressing the question of whether English is on the way to becoming a sole lingua franca in Europe. He regards "English Only" as improbable, "English generally" as probable, "an artificial language generally" as desirable so as to restrict the advantages that accrue to native speakers of a lingua franca, but as a scenario that is obstructed by the logistics of changing the entire structure of foreign language teaching in Europe, "several languages generally" as a model that only speakers of the "big" languages seem to approve of, "polyglot dialogue", on the principle of productive competence in a choice of languages and a multilingual receptive competence, is unlikely to be practicable, "the language(s) of your neighbour(s)" could be good for the speakers of "smaller" languages but is impracticable.

Each of these scenarios would in fact need detailed scrutiny and analysis at the level of principle and of the realities of supranational language use. Otherwise potentially useful strategies will remain unexplored: for instance, polyglot dialogue is widespread worldwide and could be made "practicable". Use of an artificial language such as Esperanto is invariably rejected without serious consideration being given to the issue.[xxiv]

The overall position at the supranational level is fluid, evolving and unpredictable. This state of affairs probably implies a strengthening of the interests associated with the dominant lingua francas, primarily English (for a host of reasons, see Phillipson 1992, the various contributions to *Sociolinguistica* 8), French (initially established as the dominant language of the EU, and in many ways still so) and possibly German (historically a widespread lingua franca in eastern Europe, Ammon 1991, and also in regional bodies elsewhere, Gellert-Novak 1994).

On the other hand suppport for a multilingual principle is not mere tokenism. In addition to schemes promoting the full range of official languages (see section 4.2), there is supra-national funding for the activities of the European Bureau for Lessser Used Languages, which works with the "problems" of over 30 European "regional" minority languages, some of which

represent numerically and politically influential constituencies such as the Catalans. Dónall Ó Riagáin, its Secretary General, sees the minority language speakers as the pioneers of European multilingualism:

Although marginalized in many senses, the speakers of the European Union's minority and regional languages are the original proponents of the new Europe which all of us are now committed to build. Bilingual before the LINGUA Programme was even dreamt of, preaching tolerance and advocating unity in diversity before Schuman and Monet were born, they are now building pan-European networks to promote cooperation and the sharing of information. (Introduction to the brochure "Mercator Information Networks, A resource for European languages", 1994)

The budget for the Bureau is minute as compared with many EU schemes, but the Bureau has contributed to focussing attention on minority languages and their rights. It has championed the Council of Europe's European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, which is a comprehensive document (reproduced in the appendix of Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson 1994a) setting out principles for the use of minority languages in education, the media and public services. Few states are so supportive of their minorities that they are likely to implement the Charter fully. However, it has major symbolic and norm-setting significance, even if it is riddled with escape routes for assimilationist governments (see Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson 1994b), starting with the fact that it is left up to each state to decide to which minority languages the Charter is to apply. When states grant more linguistic human rights to "their" minorities, this reflects the success of a given minority language constituency (like the Sámi in Norway, Magga 1994) in asserting their rights. On the other hand a rhetoric of endorsing the rights of all languages, as in several European Parliament resolutions, contributes to a public awareness of processes of linguistic hierarchisation and to the codification of norms in international law for the enjoyment of linguistic rights.

4.2 A three language formula

In India the management of multilingualism is supposed to rest on a foundation of children in Indian schools learning three languages in schools. This was the political compromise reached roughly a decade after independence, in an attempt to reconcile the rival claims of English, Hindi, and dominant regional languages, many of which have as many speakers as the "big" European languages. The "three language formula" attempts to meet the need for local authenticity, understanding between the various peoples that make up India, and union ("all India") nation-building. In the event, the formula has been interpreted differently in the constituent states of India[xxv], and Hindi has not replaced English as the language of power and unity, meaning that the constitutionally declared language policy has not been achieved. There are definite parallels between the Indian language policy experience and European language policy, where for several years the desirability of all EU schoolchildren learning two foreign languages has been canvassed. The second French proposal in 1995 was for the adoption of a European inter-governmental convention requiring all schoolchildren in EU countries to learn two foreign languages. Other measures frequently invoked are an early start to foreign language learning, and the diversification of languages learned in schools and in professional training.[xxvi] The proposal generated discussion and a resolution that merely confirms the status quo, which is that school foreign language learning varies widely. One factor influencing French policy-makers is an awareness of their own limited competence in foreign languages and the lack of succcess of school foreign language learning. Research in the Netherlands also indicates that there is a tendency among relatively competent foreign language users to over-rate their competence.[xxvii] The summary of the annual report of the Haut Conseil de la Francophonie for 1994 comments on the worldwide crisis in education, and desribes the teaching of languages as "a planetary defeat that needs to be remedied". One wonders whether the British government would express similar worries.[xxviii] An equivalent

verdict could not emanate from one of the smaller EU countries (the Netherlands, Scandinavia), where people are relatively more successful as foreign language learners and users. A report for the EU's LINGUA bureau echoes the conventional wisdom that foreign language learning can be seen as "the Community's Achilles heel" (Savage 1994: 12), but this ignores the fact that foreign language teaching in continental Europe overwhelmingly favours English - and this can be seen as desirable by English-speaking monolinguals and possibly others. This is perhaps a planetary disaster from a language ecology perspective, to which we return in section 6.

What the French are keen to do is to ensure that other languages are learned as well as English, particularly French, hence French endorsement of multilingualism. Trim, policy adviser to the Council of Europe Modern Languages Project, in a review of the European foreign language learning scene (1994), refers to the dead hand of the *status quo* impeding reform of foreign language learning. He suggests that the valuing of foreign language proficiency is closely associated with trade patterns: exports and imports from European countries represent a vastly higher proportion of their GDP, as compared with the US or Japan. (Similar arguments also apply in Australia). Also significant are the size of the country, smallness encouraging L2 learning, particularly if the L1 is not spoken elsewhere (Finland, Hungary,...), largeness often implying a perception of linguistic self-sufficiency (France, Britain, ...[xxix]). Trim also points out that in some countries (Finland, Belgium, Switzerland) the language of another group within the state is learned as well as "foreign" languages, this clearly being in the "national" interest, with possible international spin-offs, because the language is also used elsewhere (German is spoken in several states, for instance). Other factors that influence national language policies, explicitly or implicitly, are changing teaching paradigms, goals, and diversity in how different education systems dispense these; communications changes, which have eroded national constraints on foreign travel, and opened up mass tourism; multinational industries, satellite TV[xxx], youth culture; the appeal of particular cultures (stereotypes about France, Spain, ...); external political relations; near neighbours; and the languages of migrants, which may compete as "foreign" languages.

The LINGUA bureau of the EU has compiled detailed statistics on the teaching of foreign languages in each state, documenting its expansion in primary schools and its extent throughout formal schooling, and noting that English is overwhelmingly learned as the first foreign language in continental Europe (Eurydice 1993), but as a later study for LINGUA shows, the data are "collected on different bases and do not allow proper comparison" (Savage 1994: 5). Language learning has undoubtedly acquired greater prominence, and LINGUA evaluations suggest that pupil and teacher mobility has increased, as have transnational networks for the in-service training of language teachers (Shaw 1993). A report for LINGUA by an independent consultant on the current state of foreign language teaching and the impact of EU initiatives sees foreign language learning as a key measure for Europeanisation:

With the coming into force of the Treaty on European Union, Article 126 establishes for the first time a role for the European Community in the field of education. In discussions in all Member Sates, there was general agreement that it is right for the European Community to have a special interest in the teaching of languages. It is thought that national governments will respond more readily to a European Community initiative in the languages field than they might in other curricular areas. (Savage 1994: 12).

Savage's assessment (1994: 11) is that "most Member States have not yet reached the position of defining their own strategy for languages in a coherent form". It is in fact only in the Netherlands that there has been a major effort to create a coalescence of interest groups, particularly the business world, the state administration and scholars, in order to put foreign language planning on a surer footing (van Els 1992, 1993). Within each state there is a great deal of activity aimed at improving the learning of foreign languages, some of it spurred and aided by EU schemes. EU policies reflect a compromise between respect for "subsidiarity" in the sense of local responsibility, and global European perceptions and identities in the making. What exactly is intended by the reference to "a European Community initiative" is unclear. If one assumes that Australia's four E's might also apply in Europe, a fifth could be added,

Europeanisation. One could hypothesize that this could be specified in terms of linguistic and cultural competence at the supranational level, but this has probably not yet been attempted.[xxxi] Patterns of language use and learning are evolving fast, in tandem with changes in technology, commerce and political life. Competence in using English is built up in higher education in smaller countries through its extensive use in textbooks and scientific literature, which secondary school has equipped students for, in addition to texts in the L1. Increased student mobility has had a marked influence on higher education in EU states, as a direct result of suprastatal schemes, ERASMUS in particular.[xxxii] In theory a "multilingual principle" applies to EU schemes, and LINGUA in particular is supposed to encourage the learning of languages other than the dominant ones. On the other hand the increasing use of English in higher education in smaller countries means, for instance, that students who come to Denmark for a term from Spain, Italy or Germany are more likely to use and learn English than Danish. The cultural benefits of study abroad are manifold and manifest, but language policy in this area is a hit or miss affair. A more active policy for strengthening multilingualism would be needed.

As yet the contours of any such policy are imprecise, though attempts to delineate significant variables have been made since at least 1990, particularly in France (Truchot 1990, 1994, Carton & Odéric Delefosse 1994). Hugo Baetens Beardsmore has documented and analysed various types of bilingual education programme (1993, 1995), and reviewed a number of supranational initiatives, which leads him to conclude that "there is no centralized language planning policy at a European level, nor is this desired" (1994: 104). Professional associations such as the Fédération Internationale des Professeurs de Langues Vivantes (FIPLV) and the Association Internationale de Linguistique Appliquée (AILA) have elaborated detailed statements of language policies for the future (Batley et al 1993, Trim 1992), with recommendations to UNESCO and governments. The general picture is one of a vast number of explicit and implicit language policies and a lack of coherence.

Possible coordination of policy between three areas in which the EU has funded a great deal of work, namely language pedagogy, terminology, and machine translation/linguistic engineering was raised in 1995 at a conference in Besançon, France supported by the EU and the French Ministry of Higher Education and Research (coordinated by Claude Truchot, see the preliminary report "Plurilinguisme: Quelles initiatives dans l'Union Européenne"). If work in developing terminology is to progress in parallel in all official languages, if computer translation is to be possible between them, and if a diversity of languages is to be learned, there is a need for a comparable effort of investment and development in each language, not merely the dominant ones. The preliminary report identifies obstacles in the way of forming a European policy (structural, logistic, psychological and political), and considers promising developments in each field. The conference made a substantial number of recommendations for submission to national and supranational authorities. A major effort, theoretical, pragmatic, and organizational, is needed if coordination and policy formation is to match up to the sociolinguistic realities of language use and learning and if policy goals are to be attained. It is unclear whether there is the political will to undertake this.

In India, several researchers have identified lack of political will to implement the declared language policy as one of the main reasons for the goals of the policy not being achieved (e.g. Annamalai 1994). As a result, the linguistic hierarchy remains mainly in place, official policies are posturing, and covert policies and influences largely set the agenda. If European language policies are to succeed, they would have to be much more explicit than what has been attempted in India and, thus far, in the EU.

5. Exemplification of multilingual policy means and goals

We shall now briefly consider criteria for multilingual education policy, in order to assess whether achieving policy goals in Australia and Europe is likely to suffer through a failure to take into account the available research evidence.

We shall do this by invoking the four E's named in Australia's policy goals. We shall then relate educational models which are known to promote high levels of bi- and multilingualism to the

four E's, and consider their relevance to the implementation and achievement of declared language policy goals. This can only be done in outline, because of constraints of space. "Early foreign language learning", which is being campaigned for energetically in Europe, is a policy initiative that largely derives from a recognition that foreign language learning in formal education is insufficiently successful. It is assumed that this is due to the age at which foreign language learning began, rather than because teachers were under-qualified, or the teaching aimed at passing written exams rather than communication, or could have been organized differently. The proposed solution, say starting at age 8 rather than 12, is thus based on a partial diagnosis of the problem, an inadequate understanding of differences, similarities and interrelationships between L1 and L2 learning and between informal and formal language learning. It embodies an unscientific hope that the education system can deliver the goods without major changes. This also has implications for budgets and training.

As the practice of multilingual education has expanded, different models have been developed to respond to various purposes. The classic definition of bilingual education requires that the educational system uses two languages as media of instruction, in subjects other than the languages themselves (Andersson & Boyer 1978). We divide the types of education which have been labelled as bilingual education into three different groups: weak forms, strong forms, and non-forms of bilingual education.[xxxiii]

The *non-forms* are so termed because although they go under the name of bilingual education, they do not properly fall within the terms of the classic definition. They are types of education where saying "bilingual" is sheer rhetoric. The *weak* forms of bilingual education have monolingualism, strong dominance in the majority language, or limited bilingualism as their linguistic aim rather than multilingualism and multiliteracy. Some of them belong to the category of bilingual education in its classic sense because they use two languages as media of instruction. This is true of all transitional models. The *strong forms* of bi- and multilingual education have as their linguistic aim to promote multilingualism (or, minimally, bilingualism) and multiliteracy for all participants in the programme. It is only the strong forms of bilingual education that we shall relate to the 4 Australian E's.

Four types are relevant: the plural multilingual model (also called mainstream bilingual/multilingual), the immersion model, the two-way dual language model (also called bilingual immersion), the maintenance model (also called language shelter or heritage language model) (for detailed presentation see Skutnabb-Kangas & García 1995).

1. Plural Multilingual model. The European Union Schools are the prototype for this model.[xxxiv] There are currently (1995) 10 schools of this type in 6 EU countries, with roughly 15,000 students. They encompass grades 1-12 and lead to the European Baccalaureate. The schools have 8 to 11 subsections. The languages of the various subsections, which are initially used as media of instruction, are the official languages of the member states. In this sense, all children are considered "language majority students" and each language is a "majority" language. The students differ in nationality and language background - therefore "plural". Several languages are used as media of instruction, according to a carefully planned progression, and teachers are bilingual as a minimum. The goal is that all students become not only bilingual but multilingual - therefore "multilingual".

The societal aim[xxxv] is clearly one of enrichment and pluralism, while the linguistic aim is to make students high level multilinguals and multiliterates, able to function in the EU and beyond.

2. Immersion model. This originally Canadian model has spread to many countries.[xxxvi] Immersion programmes typically involve ethnolinguistic majority children, although there are some exceptions.[xxxvii] Two languages are used as media of instruction, initially the students' second language[xxxviii], and the teachers are bilingual, even if they only speak the students' L2 in class. Early, partial and late immersion models aim to make students bilingual (or, in Europe, multilingual) and biliterate so that they can function in (and draw benefit from) plural societies. The societal goals have hitherto related less to equity than to middle class populations maintaining advantages and privileges or gaining new ones.

3. Two-way Dual Language model. The bilingual immersion schools in California and

elsewhere in the United States are the prototype.[xxxix] There are both majority and minority students in the same class, and both languages (in most cases English and Spanish) are used as media of instruction with both groups, with the minority language dominating initially. Again, the objective of this type of bilingual education model is enrichment and pluralism, and bilingualism and biliteracy, for both the majority and the minority group. Alternate days programmes can be seen as a sub-category of two-way programmes.[xl]

4. Maintenance model. These classes/schools are often organized and/or requested by an ethnolinguistic minority community. Most typically they educate minority children using both the minority and the majority language. Initially, the students' native language is used for most content matter education, especially in cognitively demanding, decontextualised subjects, while the majority language is taught as a subject only. Later on, some (but by no means all) maintenance programmes use the majority language as a medium of education for part of the time, but in proper maintenance programmes the minority language continues as a medium of education in several subjects throughout the school.

For a few national minorities, maintenance programmes are a self-evident, "normal" way of educating their children, a natural human right. It is indicative that most minorities of this type, e.g. the Swedish-speakers in Finland, Afrikaans- and English-speakers in South Africa, or Russian-speakers in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, are either former power minorities and/or are in a transitional phase where they have to accept the fact that they no longer have the power to impose their will on a numerical majority, but where they still have the power to organize their own children's education through the medium of their own language.

Of course, it should be a fundamental, self-evident linguistic and educational human right for *any* ethnolinguistic minority to use its own language as the main medium of education.[xli] But in fact most minorities in the world do not have this basic right.[xlii] A few indigenous peoples (who are mostly numerically a minority in their own countries) have maintenance programmes (see e.g. Black 1990, Harris 1990, Kāretu 1994, Magga 1994, McLaughlin 1992, McLaughlin & Tierney (eds.) 1993, Stairs 1988, Vorih & Rosier 1978 for examples). Most of them do not (see e.g. Hamel 1994a, b). Most immigrant and refugee minority children do not have access to maintenance programmes either, even if it has been shown that such programmes result in high levels of bi/multilingualism, enhanced school achievement and more societal equity.[xliii]

The purpose of this type of multilingual programme is to ensure that language minority children continue to maintain and develop their mother tongue up to either a native level (national minorities, indigenous peoples) or at least near-native (immigrant minorities), learn the majority language at a native level, become biliterate, and achieve academically. In a European context, they typically also learn further foreign languages. This type of multilingual programme enriches society at large by ensuring that minorities gain access to the linguistic and educational prerequisites for social, economic and political integration.

Although the strong forms of multilingual education have different sociolinguistic realities with regard to the linguistic background of the students and the language(s) of the classroom, and different sociopolitical realities with regard to the power relations between the groups attending and the rest of society, they all share an aim of cultural and linguistic pluralism, with the multilingualism and multiliteracy of students as an avowed minimum aim.

The reasons for choosing bilingual or multilingual education often vary for diverse groups. Some have recognized multilingual education as a means to make their own children bilingual, thereby improving opportunities for doing business, getting ahead and maintaining privileges. Immersion programmes, the European Schools and International Schools[xliv] are examples of this approach.

For other groups, multilingual education represents a means to better understanding of other ethnolinguistic groups with which they are in contact. Immersion programmes and two-way programmes may have an element of this "integrative" motivation.

For others, such as threatened ethnolinguistic groups, multilingual education represents a means of linguistic survival. Maintenance/language shelter programmes or revitalization programmes for minorities, e.g. the Frisian schools in the Netherlands or the Finnish schools in Sweden or Kōhanga Reo programmes in New Zealand, are of this type.

Yet another use of bilingual education has been the provision of education in the mother tongue

to ethnolinguistic groups which had previously been excluded from equal educational opportunity. Again, maintenance and two-way programmes may belong in this category. Education in some African countries might be considered a type of maintenance programme.[xlv] Thus the reasons for using two languages in education vary greatly, as do the goals, among which are ethnolinguistic survival, and an increase of knowledge and potential economic gains, of improved educational opportunity, or of increased mutual understanding. Many programmes are multipurpose and combine several of the goals.[xlvi]

If we relate the educational models presented here to the four És, they can be characterized, admittedly oversimplifying somewhat, as follows:

Immersion programmes work against the equality goal. They support the enrichment goal and the economic goal for the participants in the programmes but not for the rest of the society. Several European countries have started or are starting immersion programmes, Australia also has some.

Maintenance or language shelter programmes for minorities support the equality goal and the enrichment goal for the minorities themselves, and help them economically, but do not do anything for majorities directly. Indirectly majorities benefit because maintenance models aid a better integration of minorities into the broader society, as Mohanty (1994) shows.

Two-way programmes and the European Schools plural multilingual models can function as the solution for the educational system, supporting all four goals, but certain preconditions have to be met first, to be outlined below.

Several European countries have maintenance programmes for the most established national minorities, and are building them up for some indigenous peoples. The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages can provide some support for national minorities, but the open question is whether all national minorities will be accepted as such. Several countries are contesting the principle for some minorities (e.g. Sweden for Finns, Italy for Sardinians, France and Greece for most, and the Turks deny that they have any minorities). A few European countries have maintenance programmes for some immigrated minorities, but they are contested in most countries and have to struggle to survive. Australia does not have full maintenance programmes for any minorities or indigenous peoples in the state-financed education system.

Neither Europe nor Australia has proper two-way programmes, and no variant of the European Schools model exists in Australia. Europe has more experimentation (including immersion programmes, which abound in Finland and Catalonia and are rapidly spreading in other European countries) than Australia (which has some immersion programmes - see section 3 above). Neither Europe nor Australia has large-scale programmes which would make everybody multilingual at a high level. In both, the likely long-term consequence of the most widespread minority education for immigrants is linguistic genocide. Majorities undergo education which represents monolingual reductionism, possibly with a leavening of additive foreign language learning. Several European countries offer more appropriate education than does Australia to indigenous peoples (which Australia also has) and national minorities (which, in the strict sense, Australia does not have), despite Australia's much more diversity-oriented rhetoric. On the other hand, many European countries work directly against the four E's in relation to immigrant minorities, and have still a negative, fairly openly expressed, strongly assimilationist ideology, with some racist overtones. This is not the case in Australia's rhetoric, and there are more grounds for hope in Australia than in most European countries that the gap between rhetoric and so far rather patchy implementation will be bridged.

6. Analogies between Europe and Australia, lessons?

We shall in conclusion draw some of these many threads together into a set of tentative generalizations. As might be expected, it is not so much a case of there being lessons for Europe from the Australian language policy exercise but of analogies and pointers in both directions.
(a). Both Europe and Australia are experiencing political uncertainty and *redefinitions* of national cultures and identities vis-a-vis the international. Does Danish identity include or

exclude a European Union identity, which may or may not be federal? Is Australian identity monarchist or republican, and how far is it Asian? Is language identity a central constituent of all of these? These tendencies, and the education policies derived from them, may consolidate *elite multilingualism* (business, political or academic) and entrench monolingualism as the hallmark of both more marginal groups and those who believe English unlocks all the world's secrets. The Australian language policy exercise has unquestionably been helpful and productive in bringing language policy into mainstream political *discourse*, even if many of the outstanding problems remain. Whether a comparable development can be anticipated in Europe is unclear.

(b). "*Internationalisation*" pressures, typically associated with "international" languages (which of course are national somewhere[xlvii]) are intensifying. There is in parallel a process of increased *legitimacy for some minority identities* (those of speakers of national regional or minority languages in Europe and of Aboriginal groups in Australia). The corresponding *language rights* seem to be forthcoming in Europe through the European Charter on Regional or Minority Languages for some groups (e.g. Frisians in the Netherlands) but not in Australia. However, the social context is still one of the *marginalisation* of many minorities and widespread racism towards immigrants/foreign nationals in Europe and towards Aboriginal peoples and some immigrant minorities in Australia. Also indicative of a lack of sociolinguistic awareness are the widespread ignorance of the languages of the Deaf Communities[xlviii], resistance to minority rights (e.g. France, Turkey) and to immigrated minorities developing into new national ethnic minorities (e.g. Finns in Sweden[xlix]), and to groups or communities/peoples naming themselves and their languages (e.g. Macedonians). The Australian attempt to more visibly legitimate the presence of and promote the learning of (some) immigrant languages for all (not only and not specifically native speakers) in schools could well be helpful in the European context, where these are generally deprived of any rights, though in several countries some figure as "foreign" language subjects in secondary schools.

(c). There is an intensification of *market pressures* in the economy and the media ("globalisation"), in education systems (privatisation, "internationalisation"), while simultaneously a rhetoric of human rights and social justice is articulated (e.g. Maastricht, Australian equity). In both the European and Australian contexts it appears that language learning for general educational purposes is increasingly subordinated to language learning for potential export earnings. This does not mean that cultural dimensions of foreign language learning are forgotten, but the inspiration appears to be a Thatcherite ideology of virtuous "liberalisation", which promotes linguistic imperialism, particularly that of English, and militates against an equitable ecology of language (as advocated, for instance by Mühlhäusler 1995 and Tsuda 1994). The Australian catchphrase "productive diversity" is a clever play on words on this theme.

(d). As one element dovetailing with these tendencies, there is a recognition by policy-makers (except for some diehard monolingual English-speakers) that *multilingual competence* really is essential (in the EU, two foreign languages for all, in Australia, a second language for all). This leads to a substantial investment in foreign language learning, but fundamental ambivalences remain unresolved, such as whether ethnic minority languages belong in the mainstream curriculum; how the learning of "international" languages can be in the national interest, more specifically why the French and Germans should invest in the learning of a language (English) that threatens their cultural identity; and ultimately what cultural and linguistic diversity mean for the individual, the group and the wider community.

(e). One of the challenges in both contexts is for *multilingual and multicultural education* to be organized in ways which help to resolve the contradiction between models which make élites multilingual and models which prevent minorities or powerless groups from reaching high levels of multilingualism. Linguistic plurality and multilingualism have to be seen as enriching, positive, normal and necessary for all, not only for minorities or majority élites. They must not be seen as a deficits, negative, abnormal, avoidable, where bilingual education is equated with "language X + English" (or another dominant language). Multilingual education has to encompass more than L1 + one "big" language (or two), in schools which are accessible to all, not only élites. Minority groups should be offered appropriate support for learning their L1s

and the dominant language and foreign languages. Equality goals, economic and political, must not remain mere postures or the preserve of a small set of members of western European, North American or Japanese clubs, but should be implemented widely.

(f). Popular *myths* and misconceptions about language, the role of native speakers, and what can be achieved through school foreign language learning are widespread. There is, for instance, a naive faith that if foreign language learning is started earlier, more or less in its existing form (with a quick fix from LINGUA), or if the languages to be learned are changed (a switch from French to an Asian language in Australia, or from Russian to English in eastern Europe), education can deliver the goods: enhanced success in the market economy, intercultural understanding, democracy and human rights, and a common European identity in Europe, a diversified Australian identity. Efforts to ensure that all European children become functionally trilingual need to focus on diversification of the languages to be learned and a range of learning routes, among them strong forms of multilingual education.

(g). *English* is seen as a *panacea* in continental Europe, as it is elsewhere. The arguments in favour of such a potentially lucrative language competence are so vague, abstract and intuitively obvious that there is an uncritical linguicist glorification and favouring of this language, an implicit or explicit correlative stigmatization of many other languages, and a hegemonic rationalisation of the overall language hierarchy, which frustrates the exploration of alternative models of multilingual competence. Many of the arguments are false, or favour a privileged minority (Phillipson 1992, chapter 9, Phillipson & Skutnabb-Kangas 1994). The Dutch National Action Programme on Foreign Langues documents that the popular assumption that English will serve anyone's purpose anywhere is "insufficiently supported" (van Els 1992: 71). "Almost everyone also needs German, and in view of the rapid internationalization of a great many jobs it is extremely desirable that more Dutch people should also learn French or Spanish" (van Els 1992: 21). In Australia an excessive focus on Japanese or Indonesian could fall into the same pattern. If linguistic and cultural imperialism are not counterbalanced, "multilingualism" will result in the integration of English-speaking élites worldwide who are unlikely to favour a more equitable global integration and power-sharing.

The Japanese scholar, Yukio Tsuda, brings many of these elements together by postulating that ultimately we have to choose between a "diffusion of English" paradigm and a "language ecology" paradigm, which he sees as characterized by the following (1994: 49-61):

The diffusion of English paradigm
- capitalism
- science and technology
- modernization
- monolingualism
- ideological globalization and internationalization
- transnationalization
- Americanization and homogenization of world culture
- linguistic, cultural and media imperialism

Ecology of language paradigm
- a human rights perspective
- equality in communication
- multilingualism
- maintenance of languages and cultures
- protection of national sovereignties
- promotion of foreign language education.

We see multilingual education models, i.e. advanced versions of the strong models above, as working mainly within a language ecology paradigm, and preferable to education systems which reproduce unequal power structures. The fact that they may be morally more acceptable and scientifically sound does not mean that they will spread by themselves, except where the prerequisites for major language policy changes are present or can be created. Just as racism,

classism, sexism and imperialism are not information problems (if we as researchers inform the politicians about problems and scientifically sound solutions, they will make laws and regulations accordingly, and everybody will live happily ever after), language policy is at the cutting edge of competing political and economic interests, national and supranational. As the Australian and European experience show, the number of variables, scientific, pragmatic and political, is large but essentially finite and identifiable, and it is in unravelling these variables that language policy work in future should have much to contribute, and for which a multidisciplinary applied linguistics is needed. As "Australian identity" and "European identity" change, educational, social and economic dimensions of language policy can validate language competence and cultural competence in terms of rights and resources which will in turn generate more equity locally and globally. A more differentiated description of goals and means will mean that the necessary implications for implementation and the concomit

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i   Relevant extracts from the Maastricht Treaty, 1992 (with effect from 1 January 1993) are the sections on education, training and youth, and culture:

" ... The EC will encourage co-operation between member states in the fields of education, vocational training and youth. If necessary, the EC will support and supplement their action. It will fully respect the cultural and linguistic diversity of the member states, and their responsibility for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems. EC action will be aimed at developing the European dimension in education, particularly through encouraging the teaching of languages, the mobility of students and teachers, the recognition of diplomas, co-operation, exchanges of information, and youth exchanges. The council will adopt incentive measures, but the harmonisation of laws and regulations of the member states is excluded. The council will do this on a qualified majority vote, while the parliament will have a right of amendment and veto."

"... The community will contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the member states, while respecting their national and regional diversity. At the same time it will bring the common cultural heritage to the fore. Action by the community will be aimed at encouraging cooperation between member states. If necessary, it will also support and supplement their action to improve knowledge of the history of the European peoples, conservation of cultural heritage of European significance, non-commercial cultural exchanges, and artistic and literary creation ..."

ii   `. Beernaert and Sander (1994, 1) focus on this conceptual unclarity and the lack of a "generally accepted definition of what is meant by the European dimension." See also` *Comparative Education Review* `36:1, 1992. In the work of the "Standing Conference" of European Ministers of Education, under the aegis of the Council of Europe (reported in its` *Education Newsletter*`, e.g. 5/94), the primary thrust for Europeanization appears to be school links and exchanges, which are being encouraged in order to promote understanding, open-mindedness, etc.`

iii   Several political science approaches are presented in Weinstein 1990 and the thematic number of the *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, volume 103 (1993), on "Language in Power". There is of course a substantial literature on the politics of language in particular countries, e.g. McRae 1983 and 1986 on Switzerland and Belgium. The 1994 *Annual Review of Applied Linguistics* is devoted to language policy and planning, with an overview article by the editor, Grabe. Few papers are theoretically explicit. The volume is eclectic, and uneven in quality, reflecting the callow state of the art of language policy in applied linguistics. There are also factual errors in several of the contributions to the volume, including the article on Australia. Much of Fishman's work in the sociology of language is relevant and inspiring, e.g. Fishman 1991. Many scholars refer to language policy, but seldom in more than a programmatic way, but see Truchot 1994, Labrie 1993a, Hornberger 1994. Davis 1994 distinguishes between language policy intent, implementation and experience. On economics and language, see Grin 1994, Vaillancourt 1995 and the thematic number of the *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, 121, 1996, edited by François Grin.

iv   The speakers of some loan-hungry languages such as Danish now borrow the English form "policy".

v   These may of course draw on supra-statal agreements, international covenants and the like.

vi   . There is a substantial literature on language planning, as well as such journals as *Language problems and language planning*, the *New Language Planning Newsletter* (of the Central Institute of Indian Languages, Mysore) and *Sociolinguistica*. Relevant recent collections are Baldauf & Luke (eds.) 1990, Lambert (ed.) 1994, Sajavaara et al (eds.) 1993. The relevant parameters of acquisition planning are relatively under-explored (but see Cooper 1989: chapter 7).

vii   See Skutnabb-Kangas 1991a,b,c, in press a,b, for application of this.

viii   See also the discussions on the meaning of "Europe" in Wæver et al. 1993, 4, 10.

ix   These concepts are based on the work of the Soviet ethnographer Bromley (1984).

x   Are fluid toponyms the explanation for some ex-Soviet Central Asian republics bidding for support simultaneously from "Eastern European" and "Asian" development banks?

xi   As the following excerpts from *Anna Karenina* show, for Tolstoy Russia was not toponymically part of Europe (examples 1, 2, 3). Ethnonymically, Russian peasants were not Europeans whereas the Russian aristocracy was (example 4), and politonymically again Russia was not considered part of Europe (example 5):

1."Oh, rental value!" Levin exclaimed with horror. "There may be such a thing in Europe, where the land has been improved by the labour put into it; but in this country the land is deteriorating..." (pp. 357-358).
2."But Europe is not satisfied with this system."
"No, and is looking for new methods..."
"But if it doesn't do for us? If it is stupid?" said Levin.
"... We've found the secret Europe was looking for! ... are you aware of all that's been done in Europe on the question of the organization of labour?" (p. 359; Levin, Sviazhsky).
3."...Schools will not help... "
"Yet all over Europe education is now compulsory." (p. 362; Levin, Sviazhsky).
4."We [i.e. the Russian landowners] have pushed on in our own way - the European way - a long time, without stopping to consider the nature of labour. Let us try seeing labour not as abstract man power, but as the Russian peasant with his instincts, and organize our system of agriculture accordingly." (p. 363; Levin)
5.Koznyshev ...His book, the fruit of six years' labour - Sketch of a Survey of the Principles and Forms of Government in Europe and Russia - had been finished ... (p. 803; Levin's brother).

xii   This formulation is used in Article 1, Definitions, of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, along with exclusions (dialects and migrant languages) and a definition of "non-territorial languages" aimed at covering the Roma and Jews. The text of the Charter is reproduced in the appendix of Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson 1994a.

xiii   . Or are Panjabi and Hindi only "European" when the speakers stay outside Europe, and "non-European" when the speakers move to the British school system and want their languages to be studied as "modern European languages"?

xiv   . Corbeil's analysis below (see section 4 of the paper, footnote 19) could be analysed: when he refers to "the national language/European language interface" and the learning of "all European languages", which languages are covered? Are they toponymically, politonymically or ethnonymically European, and according to which definition?

xv   On linguicism, its derivation, definition and use, see Skutnabb-Kangas 1988.

xvi   "Globalism and nationalism need not be viewed as opposing trends, doomed to spur each other on to extremes of reaction. The healthy globalization of contemporary life requires in the first instance solid identities and fundamental freedoms. The sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of States within the established international system, and the principle of self-determination for peoples, both of great value and importance, must not be permitted to work against each other in the period ahead" (Boutros-Ghali 1992:

9-10).

xvii   "'Multiculturalism' implies a variety of social interactions between individuals and groups who differ in their cultural inheritance while sharing a common geographical basis. As public policy, multiculturalism suggests a range of programs aimed at integrating those of varying cultures into a cohesive society. They do not feel obliged to submerge their cultural differences except at a pace and in ways chosen by themselves ... it is both pragmatic and idealistic." (Jupp 1991, 139). Curiously this survey article does not consider the contribution of the Australian languages policy to multiculturalism.

xviii   Gobbo argues for an emphasis on shared Australian values, rather than funds going to "sustain or preserve different cultures" (1995). In the eyes of one of the early architects of multiculturalism, Zubrzycki (1995), "the polysyllabic noun "multiculturalism" has outlived its purpose". He stresses equality of access to the nation's resources and argues against equality of outcome, stressing tolerance of ethnic diversity as the principal means of reaching the goal of developing Australia's potential.

xix   Implementation involves, in Corbeil's view,
        - guaranteeing national language use in all domains,
        - organizing the use of foreign languages in external relations (political, commercial, professional, scientific) along principles of functional language use, determined by the communicative needs of real partners,
        - "to reconcile the generalized use of the national language in each country with functional multilingualism in external communication, it is necessary to install linguistic bridges in institutions, the function of which is to ensure the national language/European language interface" (Corbeil 1994: 312, our translation),
        - achieving this presupposes the learning of all European languages, in many forms and contexts,
        - special measures are needed in the fields of the labelling and description of consumer products, contracts, and policy documents in order to maintain multilingualism,
        - the role of translation in European policy needs clarification, to achieve goals of public information.

xx   See the papers for the press conference of 14 December 1994 on "Priorités de la présidence française pour la culture et le plurilinguisme", Haut Conseil de la Francophonie 1994. The French position is put unmistakably clearly in a document entitled *La francophonie et l'Europe* in the section on multilingualism, which begins by stating "The best means of defending the position of French in Europe is by promoting multilingualism" (our translation). Earlier the French Minister for European Affairs had called for a "global plan" for languages in Europe but confined his attention to a severely limited set of policy issues.

xxi   Resolution of the European Parliament, 17 May 1995, on the Treaty of Union and the 1996 conference of Heads of State, article 11:
        The cultural identity and diversity of Europe must be maintained, and there must be explicit recognition of the value of the wealth that results from the diversity, cultural and linguistic, national and regional, of the European Union.
        There can be no restriction in the number of official EU languages and EU working languages.
        In view of the multicultural nature of the European community, the need to promote an intercultural dialogue aiming at strengthening mutual understanding and tolerance must be stressed.

xxii   Irish and Luxemburgish are also treaty languages, but do not have the status of official languages or working languages.

xxiii   The new Commission headquarters building taken into service in 1995 did not have enough booths for interpreters from the newly admitted countries.

xxiv   An experienced UN interpreter regards Esperanto as the victim of a taboo (Piron 1995). It is rejected *a priori*, without study of how it operates, or of the research evidence, or comparative study of interpretation into natural languages and investment in learning these. Esperanto is in fact used constantly in international conferences, in different parts of the world (more than 100 countries), and two to three books are published in it each week. It is easy to learn and use, and could be vastly more cost effective than interpretation, and be more functional in transmitting messages directly. There are also now native speakers of Esperanto growing up.

xxv   Among the factors contributing to resistance to change have been opposition to Hindi in southern states, the promotion of Sanskrit as one of the three languages, some states not insisting on three at all, and in general a focus on education through the medium of a single language, particularly English, rather than bi- or

multilingual education.

xxvi The pressure group "Le monde bilingue" is campaigning along similar lines and appealing for the adoption of "A European Charter for Multilingual Education" within its Pax Linguis programme, with the support of several senior French politicians. See, for instance, the booklet "La paix par les langues", Jean-Marie Bressand, 1995 and Hagège 1995. The address of the organization is 9, rue de la famille, F-25000 Besançon, France.

xxvii "The Dutch are not fully convinced of the usefulness and necessity of a knowledge of foreign languages. The consequences of ongoing internationalization for our foreign languages are underestimated, even in trade and industry. Besides, the Dutch are too impressed by the fact that foreigners speak very highly of their command of foreign languages and their ability to learn foreign languages ... The fact that their foreign language competence compares very favourably with that of other Europeans does not mean that they have enough foreign language skills to meet their own objectives." (van Els 1992: 35).

xxviiiAt one point only two members of John Major's cabinet had any competence in a language other than English. This is worrying enough, as one can fairly conclude that this limits the understanding of British ministers of continental European cultures, and presumably their negotiating position in Brussels, though not necessarily more than that of those who choose to function in a foreign language with inadequate competence in it. What is perhaps more worrying is whether the two atypical ministers are suspected by mainstream monolinguals of letting down the side by being suspiciously interested in other cultures and languages. For a survey of efforts to strengthen foreign language learning in Britain, including details of private sector attitudes, see Hagen 1994. On monolingual British teenagers' attitudes to foreign cultures and languages, as compared with their contemporaries in France, see Young 1995.

xxix Hugo Baetens Beardsmore reports (private communication) that when he was invited as a language policy expert to adress the European Parliament, the representatives of Britain, France and Germany were absent.

xxx Foreign language teaching in the smaller EU countries benefits substantially from learners being exposed to foreign films in their original language on television, subtitled, whereas countries like France and Germany dub them.

xxxi The EU has assisted in the birth of "European" degrees, for instance "European MA" programmes in which faculty and staff from several states participate and which go beyond the student mobility of ERASMUS schemes. There are also plans for encouraging such links at the Ph.D. level. While this is highly desirable culturally, it is likely to strengthen the hold of the strongest supranational languages, particularly English.

xxxii A conference was held in Stockhom in 9-10 June 1995 on "Language studies in Europe. Co-operation in higher education", organized by the Sigma Scientific Committee on Languages for the European Commission (DG XII - Education, Training and Youth). National reports on each country were prepared, covering language degree programmes offered by universities, initial and in-service training of language teachers, language provision for students of other disciplines, the training of translators and interpreters, language studies in non-university institutions of higher education, new needs and measures to satisfy these. This EU programme does not fund research activities, but is encouraging links to increase mobility at all levels, from undergraduate to doctoral.

xxxiiiThe following section builds on Skutnabb-Kangas & García 1995, developing Baker's distinction between weak and strong models of multilingual education. For these and typologies of bilingual education, see Baker 1993, 153ff, and Skutnabb-Kangas 1984, chapter 6, which Baker in turn developed.

xxxiv See references to Baetens Beardsmore (especially 1995) in the bibliography for descriptions and evaluations of these schools. See the analysis of the European Schools model and its applicability elsewhere in the contributions to Skutnabb-Kangas (ed.) 1995.

xxxv For the concepts of linguistic and societal goals, especially when these do not tally with the officially expressed goals, which sometimes function as a smokescreen, in vintage doublespeak, see Skutnabb-Kangas 1988, 1991b, in press b, and the introduction and final comments by the editors in Skutnabb-Kangas & Cummins (eds.) 1988.

xxxvi Early, late or partial immersion programmes that have been studied and reported on exist in many countries, e.g. Australia (e.g. Clyne (ed.) 1986), Canada (e.g. Genesee 1976, 1985, 1987, Lambert & Tucker

1972, Swain & Lapkin 1982), Catalunya (e.g. Artigal 1995), Finland (e.g. Helle, in press), Hungary (e.g. Duff, 1991), USA. Many countries are trying them out, but without much research follow-up. Others are planning them (e.g. Estonia, see Ülle Rannut 1992). For further references on immersion programmes in other countries, see Artigal 1995, Cummins 1995 and Genesee 1987.

xxxvii   See e.g. Taylor, in press, on indigenous Mi'kmaq children in Canadian French immersion. See also Swain et al 1990.

xxxviii   Except when clearly indicated, we use "L2" or "*second* language" to mean the language which is the *second in the order of learning* for the student (as opposed to the first language or a third or fourth language). A second language in this sense may or may not be a language which is not the student's mother tongue but which the student can hear and use in the immediate environment outside the home, one of the other common ways of defining a second language. In this definition the second language is opposed to a foreign language, which one does not use daily in the environment.

xxxix See Dolson & Lindholm 1995 for an excellent overview of the goals, set-up and preliminary results of these programmes, and Christian 1994, Christian & Mahrer 1992, 1993 and Christian & Montone 1994 for detailed yearly overviews and some comparisons of existing programmes. See also references to Lindholm in the bibliography for some of the evaluations.

xl   See Curtis 1988 for a description of an alternate days programme, from its inception to its preliminary but temporary death - it functions in Calistoga again. See also Tucker et al. 1970 for an early description of this type of programme, in the Philippines.

xli   This is recognized, for instance, in Estonian regulations on education where, even in the future, Russian-speakers can have their entire education, including secondary schools, through the medium of Russian if they so wish, and study Estonian as a second language (Rannut & Rannut 1995). This is important to note because of the misinformation about the Baltic states that is common in some Russian propaganda.

xlii   See articles in Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson (eds.) 1994, for analyses and examples; see also Minority Rights Group (ed.) 1994.

xliii   See e.g. Skutnabb-Kangas 1987 and articles in Peura & Skutnabb-Kangas (eds.) 1994, for examples of Finnish migrant minority children in maintenance programmes in Sweden, where the Finnish working class migrant minority children, after 9 years of Finnish-medium classes, score somewhat better than Swedish middle class children in parallel classes in the same schools in a Swedish language test and almost as well as Finnish children in Finland in a Finnish language test; see also Eriksson 1994. Ethnic mother-tongue schools in the United States are of this type, see Fishman 1980, García 1988, García and Otheguy 1988.

xliv   Most International Schools (see e.g. Carder 1995) are not part of bilingual/multilingual education in the classical sense of the term, because they only use one language of instruction.

xlv   See e.g. Obura 1986, Akinnaso 1993. Birgit Brock-Utne's assessment (1993, 39) is that in many African countries the majority language is treated in the way minority languages are treated in the industrialized world. Therefore most African language speakers need much more educational support for their mother tongues, i.e. maintenance programmes.

xlvi   For the varied aims of multilingual education, see, e.g. Baker 1993; Ferguson, Houghton and Wells 1977; Fishman 1976; Hornberger 1991; Lo Bianco 1990; Mohanty 1994.

xlvii   This does not apply to the truly international languages like Esperanto.

xlviii See e.g. Branson & Miller 1993, 1994, the Newsletter of the World Federation of the Deaf and articles in Ahlgren & Hyltenstam (eds.) 1994.

xlix   See e.g. Skutnabb-Kangas, in press b.